Mental timing studies may be influenced by powerful cognitive illusions that can produce an asymmetry in their rate of progress relative to neuronal timing studies. Both types of timing research are also governed by a temporal asymmetry, expressed by the fact that the direction of causation must follow time's arrow. Here we refresh our earlier suggestion that the temporal asymmetry offers promise as a means of timing mental activities. We update our earlier analysis of Libet's data within this framework. Then we consider the surprises which often occur on those rare occasions when neural timing experiments parallel mental timing work exactly. Together, these surprises and asymmetries prescribe a relentlessly meticulous and fully transparent exposition of timing methods, terms, and concepts which shuns plausible narratives, even when buttressed by rigorous formal models, unless guided by apposite empirical evidence.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Dawn broke on the natural-science approach to neuronal and mental timing when Adrian (1928) compared the temporal properties of afferent spikes with those of sensation measurements. An asymmetry immediately emerged: On the one hand, Adrian's studies of the properties of single sensory neurons contributed to the foundation underpinning the present golden age of neuroscience, a time marked by cumulative orderly progress in which partial understandings have steadily become more complete and errors have progressively been corrected. On the other hand, and at essentially the same time, these early comparisons of neuronal and mental timing were marred by an illusory correlation (Wasserman & Kong, 1974) which is so powerful that it still afflicts even recent scholarship (Ward, 1991; Wasserman, 1991) despite its authoritative recognition (Uttal, 1981) . The illusion is created by the use of the same measurement units (i.e., milliseconds) to quantify completely different characteristics: stimulus duration versus time after stimulus onset. This illusion evaded correction for two reasons: first, because mental activities are not directly observable in the way that neural activities are and, second, because the neural/mental comparison employed an apparently plausible narrative rather than parallel experiments.
In order for an investigator to escape the grasp of such illusions, the most meticulous and transparent exposition of methods, terms, and concepts is essential and this exposition must be empirically grounded. A relevant example of such method was provided by Hartline (1934) even before this dawn's glow had faded. Specifically, Hartline varied the intensity and duration of light flashes falling on the compound eye of the horseshoe crab while extracellular recordings were taken of spikes propagating in single optic nerve axons which had been teased apart from the rest of the optic nerve. Hartline asked when the reciprocal trade-off of these two stimulus properties failed in the sense that changes in duration no longer had effects similar to changes in intensity. This question led to a first-approximation natural-science answer based on a second asymmetry that Hartline derived from the scientific ur-principle that causality must be asymmetric in time. Hartline particularly suggested that reciprocity must break down whenever the response latency is shorter than the stimulus duration. If that were not so, then the portion of a stimulus which arrived after the latent period would have to be able to operate backward in time.
INTRACELLULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Our group followed the path opened by Hartline by executing a number of careful and transparent studies of neuronal timing and its relation to mental timing. Our strategy was to replicate the conditions used in behavioral experiments while recording from single neurons. That allowed us to compare inferences about mental activities, which are derived from the former type of experiment, with actual observations of neural activities. Descriptions of the various contributions to this research program have been given in Wasserman and Kong (1979) , Wasserman (1980, 1981) , Nisly and Wasserman (1989) , Nisly-Nagele and Wasserman (2001) , Wasserman, Wang-Bennett, and Miyamoto (1990) , Wasserman (1996a, 1996b) , Wasserman and Nisly-Nagele (2001) , Lim and Wasserman (2001) , as well as in Bolbecker, Cheng, and Wasserman (2001) . In most cases, these are summary descriptions of work originally communicated in a larger number of primary research reports.
We began by following up on Hartline's extracellular study by using sharp intracellular microelectrodes to record from horseshoe crab photoreceptors as well as from their associated optic nerve cells. We found three things (Wasserman & Kong, 1979) : first, that Hartline's suggestion was approximately correct but it would be more precise to say that reciprocity breaks down some milliseconds before the latent period ends; second, that this regularity was invariant over three levels of this model nervous system; and third, that Hartline had correctly conjectured that reciprocity would end at different times for response features that had different latencies.
Knowing this, one could determine the absolute time when a neural feature had occurred by determining when reciprocity failed. This can be done without clocking the neural responses themselves. Consider, for example, taking the threshold spike discharge as a simple response feature. An investigator need not clock such discharges by displaying them on the screen of an oscilloscope (or latterly, a computer monitor) and using the time base scale to assign times to such discharges. Instead, an investigator could simply listen to the spike discharges via a loudspeaker while adjusting the controls of a stimulator. The investigator's determination of the stimulus durations which were too long to affect such threshold spiking could be used by the investigator to determine the absolute timing of such responses even if the investigator had no other information about the spike discharge other than whether it had occurred.
Making the psychobiologic assumption that mental activities are an expression of neural activities and should therefore exhibit similar functional properties, we (Wasserman & Kong, 1979) suggested that such reciprocity failures should be considered as means of determining the absolute timing of otherwise unobservable mental activities provided one also recognized the possibility that mental activities might range from those which are brief (events) to those which extend over a period of time (processes). Specifically, we suggested that an investigator who monitored the observable behavior of a subject while determining, first, when stimulus duration failed to affect that behavior and, second, how duration traded against intensity could thereby make a declaration about the absolute timing of the hidden mental activity which had mediated that behavior. Such declarations would indicate when a process had ended or when an event had occurred. This suggestion was buttressed by research reports (reviewed in Wasserman & Kong, 1979) which demonstrated that reciprocity lasted for a very short time when simple detection tasks were involved while it lasted for a very long time when complex cognitive identifications were required. Other things being equal, such task changes could vary the reciprocity time from less than a tenth of a second to more than a full second.
The original work on which Wasserman and Kong (1979) had relied was incomplete in that it did not assess the state dependencies associated with changes in light and dark adaptation. Further research was therefore done to assess the effect of this very powerful sensory variable (Wasserman, Wang-Bennett, & Miyamoto, 1990) . This rather painstaking project demonstrated that the short interval between the breakdown of reciprocity and the end of the latent period depends systematically on the state of light adaptation. Hence, any studies that used this approach to determine the absolute timing of mental activities would need to control adaptation state quite rigorously.
ENCOUNTER WITH LIBET
At this point, we encountered Libet (1979) , who served as a commentator on Wasserman and Kong (1979) . In our target article, we discussed his early work (Libet, 1966) as well as his more contemporaneous efforts (Libet, 1973 (Libet, , 1978 . Those early presentations of Libet had provided a fair amount of technical detail which made it clear that his results did not require the invocation of any numinous characteristics. Instead, his data were quite concordant with our natural-science approach to mental timing. Our target article briefly observed that Libet's data exhibited an uncertainty interval of approximately 100 ms. Klein's (2002) careful quantitations confirm this brief observation by providing psychometric functions with parameters estimated by formal procedures. Libet's (1979) elliptical commentary took strong exception to our presentation. This is not surprising because, as diagrammed comprehensively in these pages by both Gomes (2002) and Klein (2002) , Libet had rather clearly promulgated the dualist notion of back-referral in time by 1979 and so any natural-science account of his data would be troublesome.
A second and more complete exchange of views on mental timing occurred when Libet (1985) wrote his own target article. The attraction of his views to convicted dualists was not difficult to detect and quite a few of the other commentators on his target article noted his association with dualist views of the mind-body issue. The chronotheological character of Libet's system was characterized by Wasserman's (1985) commentary which made another attempt to provide a meticulous and transparent natural-science exposition of Libet's methods, terms, and concepts. That exposition foreshadows and complements the similarly meticulous and transparent analyses developed in the present special issue by Klein (2002) , Gomes (2002), and Pockett (2002) , as well as by Trevena and Miller (2002) .
The need to provide a fully transparent commentary on Libet led Wasserman into a detailed consideration of a critical metrical principle: A measuring operation and the thing being measured simply do not have to be coincident or synchronous. The example that was given by Wasserman (1985) was the determination of stellar velocities by measuring the shift of their emission spectra toward the red end of the spectrum. Patently, an observer does not have to reside on a star in order to determine its velocity. Indeed, a star that is being measured might well be separated in both space and in time from a knowledgeable observer by many light years. Yet an observer's knowledge about the relation between velocity and spectral shift makes it possible for a star's relative velocity to be extracted readily from a given star's red shift. And, as is well known, such measurements directly led to profound cosmological inferences about the expansion of the universe in which we live.
OPTICAL AND NEURAL PROPAGATION DELAYS
This is not a mere analogy: An exact counterpart of the delays in the earthly arrival of starlight is provided by the delays caused by the need to process and conduct information in the nervous system. Because of these delays, the neural activities that are causally related to a particular behavior will generally occur at different places and at different times than the observable behavior itself. Yet an investigator in possession of sufficient knowledge of neural timing would be able to make inferences about the absolute timing of unobservable mental activities by analyzing their reciprocities.
If Libet had executed a meticulously transparent analysis of his proposition, he would perforce have had to deal with every such delay. That, to take an example considered fairly completely by Wasserman (1985) , would have required him to consider the time required for observers to process the neural representation of the clockspot that Libet favored as a mental timing tool. The minimum value of this time must be greater than zero because the transduction of light in photoreceptors and the conduction of the results of such transduction to the brain by optic nerve fibers impose delays of tens and even hundreds of milliseconds between the presentation of an external clock-spot and the beginning of any activity representing it in the brain. An observer's perception of the clock-spot must therefore also be subject to the same minimum delay. Contra Libet (1979) , the validity of this proposition does not depend in the least on the details of any particular psychobiological view. It only depends on a natural-science knowledge of the anatomy and physiology of the eye-brain connection.
This aspect of the timing problem has recently become even more interesting because neuromodulators released in the eye by efferents from the brain have just been demonstrated to alter the timing of photoreceptor responses to light in a quite radical way (Lim & Wasserman, 2001 ). In the presence of a neuromodulator, brief flashes, which ordinarily evoke responses that only last a few hundred milliseconds, may evoke receptor potentials that last for the better part of a second. Anatomy is library and so rather than the clock-spot being a precision mental chronometer, it is now possible to wonder if its readings might be affected by the observer's intentions. Libet's (1985) response to our commentary evaded discussion of these principled issues, giving essentially no response, and so we proceeded with our program of research. This program has produced constant surprises that demonstrate the need for comparisons between fully parallel empirical studies of physiology and behavior. Regrettably, investigators too often use discipline-specific research designs that compromise such comparisons. This difficulty is often compounded by the proffering of plausible narratives. Unfortunately, persuasive speech just is not adequate when it is not founded on appropriate data.
EMPIRICAL WORK ON VISUAL TIMING
We had started down our research program even before encountering Libet and we next took up an examination of visual masking (Felsten & Wasserman, 1980) . We had begun that project expecting to confirm the then-commonplace view that two kinds of backward masking existed: one was based on established knowledge about the mechanisms underlying neural integration and the other, generalizing from information processing concepts, was based on a postulated interruption of visual information processing. To our surprise, we found that neural integration at the retinal level interrupted retinal signals in ways that quantitatively matched the interruptions found in behavior.
Some of the particulars of this masking work turned our attention to perceived duration (Felsten & Wasserman, 1981; Nisly & Wasserman, 1989; ). To our knowledge, this phenomenon was first quantitatively characterized in Babylon by Mar Samuel's (d. 254 CE) division of the hour [reviewed by Gandz (1952) ]. After conversion to modern units of time, this overlooked yet remarkable quantification of the briefest visual sensations suggested that a twinkling of an eye (heref 'ayyin) equaled 63 ms while a moment or atom (rega') was twice as long. Several millennia of careful work on this problem (reviewed in Nisly & Wasserman, 1989; ) had left us with very precise numerical expectations about the outcome of our program of research on photoreceptor contributions to perceived duration.
Since all visual information passes through the photoreceptors, we thought it not unreasonable to assume that knowledge of photoreceptor neuroscience was not only relevant to perceived duration studies, but that such knowledge was essential for any fair interpretation of such data. But once again, we were surprised: Because of the ancient and extensive background of this work, the designs of the Nisly-Nagele and Wasserman studies covered a wide gamut of conditions and thereby embodied a large number of quite exact quantitative expectations. Yet every single quantitative expectation was disconfirmed by these data. Some disconfirmations occurred because light intensity and adaptation state did not always affect these results. Others came because Piéron's Law (relating log latency linearly to log intensity) did not always govern these data. These data mandate that mental timing studies be particularly sensitive to the possibility that preliminary and partial results may give a very misleading view which can lead plausible narratives astray.
Further surprises came from objective characterizations of the precision of various features of the responses in photoreceptors and optic nerve fibers (Cheng & Wasserman, 1996a , 1996b . Here we used a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) approach to characterize the amount of information which resided in a given response feature when corresponding measurements were collected within both types of neurons. As a bonus, these ROC data allowed us to characterize the amount of information that various response features transmitted from receptors to optic nerve cells. We found, to our surprise, evidence which suggested that amplitude-based features were superior to time-based features in both respects but particularly in their transmission characteristics; timing measures seemed to transmit almost no information at all.
We (Bolbecker, Cheng, & Wasserman, 2001 ) recently tested this suggestion by using the ROC method to characterize both the timing and the magnitude of the exact same response feature at both neural levels. The results were unambiguous: timing was far inferior to magnitude, both with regard to information representation and with regard to information transmission.
In sum, then, our careful and transparent empirical studies of neuronal timing using designs which parallel mental timing studies have indicated that even the most persuasive narrative arguments and formal models must be guided by empirical research. Further progress will depend on a partnership between sound analysis and good data, where the latter come from studies constructed to be parallel in both domains.
THE FUTURE OF CHRONOTHEOLOGY
In the present special issue, critical evaluations of Libet's views are being provided by other colleagues who are proceeding in the same methodical and transparent manner. Some of these contributions expand on earlier ones. Strikingly, Gomes (2002) has independently reached a conclusion about the complexity of the timing of a clockspot that is similar to the one we gave. Equally striking is Gomes (2002) perception that Libet has evaded his point. And Klein (2002) has quantitated conclusions that had previously been based on less systematic assessments.
A more analytic approach has been provided by Pockett (2002) , whose methodical critique of Libet's argument very helpfully focuses attention on his neglect of basic physiological processes, such as facilitation.
The statistical foundations of Libet's case are usefully critiqued by Trevena and Miller (2002) , who draw attention to the powerful distortions caused by his evasion of important issues concerning the distribution functions of the data on which these edifices were erected.
The question then is why did Libet's idea evoke such a high degree of interest? As noted above, one view was given by Wasserman (1985) : Libet's views support a chronotheology in which activities in the supernatural domain putatively lead to effects in the natural world of matter that can be detected by the methods of natural science. Bluntly put, in Libet's universe, immaterial intentions precede human actions.
Another view is sketched by Klein (2002) as well as by Pockett (2002) , who draw attention to the strong support which Libet's views have received from eminent figures whose reputations were largely made in other areas of scholarship.
These are not necessarily independent explanations. The dualist views of some of these eminences are well known. But to be accepted in the world of natural science, it is not unreasonable to demand that contributions partial to chronotheology provide the most meticulous and transparent expositions of their methods, terms, and concepts. We hope the present special issue will advance us toward that goal or, at least, toward a situation where dualism does not influence the content of research reports. It is therefore gratifying that the present contribution of Shevrin, Ghannan, and Libet (2002) takes a purely natural-science approach and seems to be devoid of dualism. Indeed, it proceeds in much the same matter-of-fact way as Libet originally did (Libet, 1966) . Perhaps this may signal the emergence of a new way of approaching these matters.
